The emergence of culpability as imputation in criminal methodology from the value-turn of neo-Kantian epistemology

Abstract

At the beginning of the 20th century, criminal dogmatics was impacted by the affirmation of Neo-Kantian epistemology, which introduced a new method for the theory of crime, the value-based method. This movement sought philosophical foundations different from those imposed by previous positivist epistemology, recognizing cultural sciences, which, dealing with valuable objects, were incompatible with the empirical-demonstrative approach. These developments altered German criminal dogmatics, as Neo-Kantian epistemology created a method structured around the idea of value for the scientific treatment of norms, which are valuable as cultural objects. This investigation aims to understand the re-signification of culpability during this transition. The first part critically analyzes the concept of culpability based on the positivist epistemology of the 19th century, focusing on the proposals of Binding and Liszt. The second part addresses culpability as a concept constructed through Neo-Kantian epistemology, with a focus on Frank. The emergence of culpability as the attribution of personal blame to the author is examined. The hypothesis concludes that culpability, as subjective attribution, became possible through Neo-Kantianism, which introduced a dualistic structure, combining logical and axiological coherence in the concrete application of norms.