The unenforceability of behavior appropriate to the criminal norm and its consequences for the theory of the punishable event

Abstract

Based on the relegation of the discussion and analysis of culpability with punitive urgency, the concept of the unenforceability of behavior appropriate to the criminal norm and its consequences in the theory of the punishable event will be analyzed since its emergence in criminal-legal dogmatics and its path traced by the courts and followed a posteriori by doctrine, in a traditionally inverted path. The expression in question will be recurrent and replaces the commonly used “inexigibility of different conduct”, not only for simple terminological accuracy, but mainly because of the imprecision that results from it: it is not any conduct other than the one carried out that matters to the law, but the one that is different from the one that is appropriate or in line with its normative expectations. We will then analyze the acts manifested by the will as a presupposition for the incidence of the judgment of guilt, but also the forces that trigger the aggressive act when, in a favorable situation, they exceed the total of internal inhibitions – with the natural consequence of the crime. The concept of the (a)normality of circumstances is explored as a new awakening from the dogmatic slumber of Sleeping Beauty a century after Eberhard Schmidt’s original provocation and its reflection in legal discourse, based on descriptive research, a qualitative approach, and a bibliographic review of the topic.