The inversion of the burden of proof in the crime of receipt of stolen property
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https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14154195Keywords:
receipt of stolen property, inversion of the burden of proof, presumption of innocence, case lawAbstract
This article analyzes the issue of the inversion of the burden of proof in the crime of receipt of stolen property, defined in Article 180 of the Brazilian Penal Code. The work focuses on the consolidated understanding of the Superior Court of Justice, which, interpreting Article 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, asserts that it is the defense’s responsibility to present evidence regarding the lack of knowledge about the illicit origin of the object. To this end, the analysis explores the differences between intentional and negligent receipt of stolen property; explores the issue of the burden of proof in Brazilian criminal procedure and its relationship to the presumption of innocence; and examines the compatibility of the interpretation attributed to Article 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with the constitutional provision of the state of innocence. The study concludes that an interpretation of the Article 156, guided by the presumption of innocence, is incompatible with the transfer of the burden of proof to the defense that has been applied in cases of receipt of stolen property.
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Copyright (c) 2024 Khalil Pacheco Ali Hachem
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