Turn state’s evidence and game theory: strategic challenges of criminal investigation

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Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10552713

Keywords:

Pleas, Probabilistic composition of preferences, Strategic communication and signaling, Criminal investigation, Informational justice

Abstract

This article examines the turn state’s evidence in the Brazilian legal system from the perspective of game theory and economic analysis. It addresses the importance of strategic communication and signaling in criminal investigations and highlights the need for a balance between justice and efficiency. It analyzes how game theory helps to understand the interactions between the parties involved and discusses appropriate regulation. It contributes to the debate on legislative and practical improvements related to turn state’s evidence, aiming to provide rationality to the criminal prosecution of criminal organizations.

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Author Biography

David Pimentel Barbosa de Siena, Universidade Federal do ABC - UFABC - Santo André/SP

Professor de Criminologia, Direito Penal e Direito Processual Penal da Academia de Polícia “Dr. Coriolano Nogueira Cobra” (Acadepol), da Strong Business School (Strong FGV) e da Universidade Municipal de São Caetano do Sul (USCS). Doutorando e Mestre em Ciências Humanas e Sociais pela Universidade Federal do ABC (UFABC). Delegado de Polícia do Estado de São Paulo. Lattes CV: http://lattes.cnpq.br/6594126112540565

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Published

2024-02-15

How to Cite

Pimentel Barbosa de Siena, D. (2024). Turn state’s evidence and game theory: strategic challenges of criminal investigation. Boletim IBCCRIM, 32(375), 22–25. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10552713

Issue

Vol. 32 No. 375 (2024): Boletim IBCCRIM - Fevereiro

Section

Doutrina

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